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chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.4 [security]#868

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chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.4 [security]#868
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renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability

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@renovate renovate bot commented Jan 13, 2026

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This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
hono (source) 4.10.34.12.4 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-22818

Summary

A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the algorithm specified in the JWT header to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly define an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.

Details

When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s alg field if present. If the JWK did not specify an algorithm, the middleware fell back to using the alg value provided in the unverified JWT header.

Because the alg field in a JWK is optional and commonly omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to influence which algorithm is used for verification. In some environments, this may result in authentication or authorization bypass through crafted JWTs.

The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used to make authorization decisions.

Impact

In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially leading to authentication or authorization bypass.

Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.

Resolution

Update to the latest patched release.

Breaking change:

The JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware has been updated to require an explicit allowlist of asymmetric algorithms when verifying tokens. The middleware no longer derives the verification algorithm from untrusted JWT header values.

Instead, callers must explicitly specify which asymmetric algorithms are permitted, and only tokens signed with those algorithms will be accepted. This prevents JWT algorithm confusion by ensuring that algorithm selection is fully controlled by application
configuration.

As part of this fix, the alg option is now required when using the JWK/JWKS middleware, and symmetric (HS*) algorithms are no longer accepted in this context.

Before (vulnerable configuration)

import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwk({
    jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json',
    // alg was optional
  })
)

After (patched configuration)

import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwk({
    jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json',
    alg: ['RS256'], // required: explicit asymmetric algorithm allowlist
  })
)

CVE-2026-22817

Summary

A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the JWT header’s alg value to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly specify an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.

Details

When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s alg field if present, but otherwise fell back to the alg value provided in the unverified JWT header.

Because the alg field in a JWK is optional and often omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to control the algorithm used for verification. In some environments, this may lead to authentication or authorization
bypass through crafted tokens.

The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used for authorization decisions.

Impact

In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially resulting in authentication or authorization bypass.

Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.

Resolution

Update to the latest patched release.

Breaking change:

As part of this fix, the JWT middleware now requires the alg option to be explicitly specified. This prevents algorithm confusion by ensuring that the verification algorithm is not derived from untrusted JWT header values.

Applications upgrading must update their configuration accordingly.

Before (vulnerable configuration)

import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwt({
    secret: 'it-is-very-secret',
    // alg was optional
  })
)

After (patched configuration)

import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwt({
    secret: 'it-is-very-secret',
    alg: 'HS256', // required
  })
)

CVE-2026-24398

Summary

IP Restriction Middleware in Hono is vulnerable to an IP address validation bypass. The IPV4_REGEX pattern and convertIPv4ToBinary function in src/utils/ipaddr.ts do not properly validate that IPv4 octet values are within the valid range of 0-255, allowing attackers to craft malformed IP addresses that bypass IP-based access controls.

Details

The vulnerability exists in two components:

  1. Permissive regex pattern: The IPV4_REGEX (/^[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}$/) accepts octet values greater than 255 (e.g., 999).
  2. Unsafe binary conversion: The convertIPv4ToBinary function does not validate octet ranges before performing bitwise operations. When an octet exceeds 255, it overflows into adjacent octets during the bit-shift calculation.

For example, the IP address 1.2.2.355 is accepted and converts to the same binary value as 1.2.3.99:

  • 355 = 256 + 99 = 0x163
  • After bit-shifting: (1 << 24) + (2 << 16) + (2 << 8) + 355 = 0x01020363 = 1.2.3.99

Impact

An attacker can bypass IP-based restrictions by crafting malformed IP addresses:

  • Blocklist bypass: If 1.2.3.0/24 is blocked, an attacker can use 1.2.2.355 (or similar) to bypass the restriction.
  • Allowlist bypass: Requests from unauthorized IP ranges may be incorrectly permitted.

This is exploitable when the application relies on client-provided IP addresses (e.g., X-Forwarded-For header) for access control decisions.

Affected Components

  • IP Restriction Middleware
  • src/utils/ipaddr.ts: IPV4_REGEX, convertIPv4ToBinary, distinctRemoteAddr

CVE-2026-24472

Summary

Cache Middleware contains an information disclosure vulnerability caused by improper handling of HTTP cache control directives. The middleware does not respect standard cache control headers such as Cache-Control: private or Cache-Control: no-store, which may result in private or authenticated responses being cached and subsequently exposed to unauthorized users.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the cache decision logic of Cache Middleware. When determining whether a response should be cached, the middleware does not take HTTP cache control semantics into account and may cache responses that are explicitly marked as private by the application. While some runtimes, such as Cloudflare Workers, enforce cache control restrictions at the platform level, other runtimes including Deno, Bun, and Node.js rely on the middleware’s behavior. As a result, applications running on these runtimes may unintentionally cache sensitive responses.

Impact

This issue can lead to Web Cache Deception and information disclosure. If an authenticated user accesses an endpoint that returns user-specific or sensitive data and the response is cached despite being marked as private, subsequent unauthenticated requests may receive the cached response. This may result in the exposure of personally identifiable information or session-related data. The impact is limited to applications that use the hono/cache middleware and rely on it to correctly honor HTTP cache control directives.

Affected Components

  • Cache Middleware

CVE-2026-24473

Summary

Serve static Middleware for the Cloudflare Workers adapter contains an information disclosure vulnerability that may allow attackers to read arbitrary keys from the Workers environment. Improper validation of user-controlled paths can result in unintended access to internal asset keys.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the serve-static middleware used with the Cloudflare Workers adapter. When serving static assets, the middleware does not sufficiently validate or restrict user-supplied paths before resolving them against the Workers asset storage.

As a result, an attacker may craft requests that access arbitrary keys beyond the intended static asset scope. This issue only affects applications running on Cloudflare Workers that use Serve static Middleware with user-controllable request paths.

Impact

This vulnerability may lead to information disclosure by allowing unauthorized access to internal assets or data stored in the Workers environment. The exposed data is limited to readable asset keys and does not allow modification of stored data or execution of arbitrary code.

The impact is limited to applications that use Serve static Middleware in the Cloudflare Workers adapter and rely on it to safely handle untrusted request paths.

Affected Components

  • Serve static Middleware (Cloudflare Workers adapter)

CVE-2026-24771

Summary

A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the ErrorBoundary component of the hono/jsx library. Under certain usage patterns, untrusted user-controlled strings may be rendered as raw HTML, allowing arbitrary script execution in the victim's browser.

Details

The issue is in the ErrorBoundary component (src/jsx/components.ts). ErrorBoundary previously forced certain rendered output paths to be treated as raw HTML, bypassing the library's default escaping behavior. This could result in unescaped rendering when developers pass user-controlled strings directly as children, or when fallbackRender returns user-controlled strings (for example, reflecting error messages that contain attacker input).

This vulnerability is only exploitable when an application renders untrusted user input within ErrorBoundary without appropriate escaping or sanitization.

Impact

Successful exploitation may allow attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim’s browser (reflected XSS). Depending on the application context, this can lead to actions such as session compromise, data exfiltration, or performing unauthorized actions as the victim.

Affected Components

  • hono/jsx: ErrorBoundary component

GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf

Summary

The basicAuth and bearerAuth middlewares previously used a comparison that was not fully timing-safe.

The timingSafeEqual function used normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values. This comparison may stop early if values differ, which can theoretically cause small timing differences.

The implementation has been updated to use a safer comparison method.

Details

The issue was caused by the use of normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values inside the timingSafeEqual function.

In JavaScript, string comparison may stop as soon as a difference is found. This means the comparison time can slightly vary depending on how many characters match.

Under very specific and controlled conditions, this behavior could theoretically allow timing-based analysis.

The implementation has been updated to:

  • Avoid early termination during comparison
  • Use a constant-time-style comparison method

Impact

This issue is unlikely to be exploited in normal environments.

It may only be relevant in highly controlled situations where precise timing measurements are possible.

This change is considered a security hardening improvement. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest version.

CVE-2026-29045

Summary

When using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.

The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path.

Details

The routing layer preserved %2F as a literal string, while serveStatic decoded it into / before resolving the file path.

Example:

Request: /admin%2Fsecret.html

  • Router sees: /admin%2Fsecret.html → does not match /admin/*
  • Static handler resolves: /admin/secret.html

As a result, static files under the configured static root could be served without triggering route-based protections.

This only affects applications that both:

  • Protect subpaths using route-based middleware, and
  • Serve files from the same static root using serveStatic.

This does not allow access outside the static root and is not a path traversal vulnerability.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.

Applications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths may have exposed those resources.

CVE-2026-29085

Summary

When using streamSSE() in Streaming Helper, the event, id, and retry fields were not validated for carriage return (\r) or newline (\n) characters.

Because the SSE protocol uses line breaks as field delimiters, this could allow injection of additional SSE fields within the same event frame if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

The SSE helper builds event frames by joining lines with \n. While multi-line data: fields are handled according to the SSE specification, the event, id, and retry fields previously allowed raw values without rejecting embedded CR/LF characters.

Including CR/LF in these control fields could allow unintended additional fields (such as data:, id:, or retry:) to be injected into the event stream.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting CR/LF characters in these fields.

Impact

An attacker could manipulate the structure of SSE event frames if an application passed user-controlled input directly into event, id, or retry.

Depending on application behavior, this could result in injected SSE fields or altered event stream handling. Applications that render e.data in an unsafe manner (for example, using innerHTML) could potentially expose themselves to client-side script injection.

This issue affects applications that rely on the SSE helper to enforce protocol-level constraints.

CVE-2026-29086

Summary

The setCookie() utility did not validate semicolons (;), carriage returns (\r), or newline characters (\n) in the domain and path options when constructing the Set-Cookie header.

Because cookie attributes are delimited by semicolons, this could allow injection of additional cookie attributes if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

setCookie() builds the Set-Cookie header by concatenating option values. While the cookie value itself is URL-encoded, the domain and path options were previously interpolated without rejecting unsafe characters.

Including ;, \r, or \n in these fields could result in unintended additional attributes (such as SameSite, Secure, Domain, or Path) being appended to the cookie header.

Modern runtimes prevent full header injection via CRLF, so this issue is limited to attribute-level manipulation within a single Set-Cookie header.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting these characters in the domain and path options.

Impact

An attacker may be able to manipulate cookie attributes if an application passes user-controlled input directly into the domain or path options of setCookie().

This could affect cookie scoping or security attributes depending on browser behavior. Exploitation requires application-level misuse of cookie options.


Release Notes

honojs/hono (hono)

v4.12.4

Compare Source

v4.12.3

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.2...v4.12.3

v4.12.2

Compare Source

Security fix

Fixed incorrect handling of X-Forwarded-For in the AWS Lambda adapter behind ALB that could allow IP-based access control bypass. The detail: GHSA-xh87-mx6m-69f3

Thanks @​EdamAme-x

What's Changed

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.1...v4.12.2

v4.12.1

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.0...v4.12.1

v4.12.0

Compare Source

Release Notes

Hono v4.12.0 is now available!

This release includes new features for the Hono client, middleware improvements, adapter enhancements, and significant performance improvements to the router and context.

$path for Hono Client

The Hono client now has a $path() method that returns the path string instead of a full URL. This is useful when you need just the path portion for routing or key-based operations:

const client = hc<typeof app>('http://localhost:8787')

// Get the path string
const path = client.api.posts.$path()
// => '/api/posts'

// With path parameters
const postPath = client.api.posts[':id'].$path({
  param: { id: '123' },
})
// => '/api/posts/123'

// With query parameters
const searchPath = client.api.posts.$path({
  query: { filter: 'test' },
})
// => '/api/posts?filter=test'

Unlike $url() which returns a URL object, $path() returns a plain path string, making it convenient for use with routers or as cache keys.

Thanks @​ShaMan123!

ApplyGlobalResponse Type Helper for RPC Client

The new ApplyGlobalResponse type helper allows you to add global error response types to all routes in the RPC client. This is useful for typing common error responses from app.onError() or global middlewares:

const app = new Hono()
  .get('/api/users', (c) => c.json({ users: ['alice', 'bob'] }, 200))
  .onError((err, c) => c.json({ error: err.message }, 500))

type AppWithErrors = ApplyGlobalResponse<
  typeof app,
  {
    401: { json: { error: string; message: string } }
    500: { json: { error: string; message: string } }
  }
>

const client = hc<AppWithErrors>('http://api.example.com')
// Now client knows about both success and error responses
const res = await client.api.users.$get()
// InferResponseType includes { users: string[] } | { error: string; message: string }

Thanks @​mohankumarelec!

SSG Redirect Plugin

A new redirectPlugin for SSG generates static HTML redirect pages for HTTP redirect responses (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):

import { toSSG } from 'hono/ssg'
import { defaultPlugin, redirectPlugin } from 'hono/ssg'

const app = new Hono()
app.get('/old', (c) => c.redirect('/new'))
app.get('/new', (c) => c.html('New Page'))

// redirectPlugin must be placed before defaultPlugin
await toSSG(app, fs, {
  plugins: [redirectPlugin(), defaultPlugin()],
})

The generated redirect pages include a <meta http-equiv="refresh"> tag, a canonical link, and a robots noindex meta tag.

Thanks @​3w36zj6!

onAuthSuccess Callback for Basic Auth

The Basic Auth middleware now supports an onAuthSuccess callback that is invoked after successful authentication. This allows you to set context variables or perform logging without re-parsing the Authorization header:

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  basicAuth({
    username: 'hono',
    password: 'ahotproject',
    onAuthSuccess: (c, username) => {
      c.set('user', { name: username, role: 'admin' })
      console.log(`User ${username} authenticated`)
    },
  })
)

The callback also works with async functions and the verifyUser mode.

Thanks @​AprilNEA!

getConnInfo for AWS Lambda, Cloudflare Pages, and Netlify

getConnInfo() is now available for three additional adapters:

// AWS Lambda (supports API Gateway v1, v2, and ALB)
import { handle, getConnInfo } from 'hono/aws-lambda'

// Cloudflare Pages
import { handle, getConnInfo } from 'hono/cloudflare-pages'

// Netlify
import { handle, getConnInfo } from 'hono/netlify'

app.get('/', (c) => {
  const info = getConnInfo(c)
  return c.text(`Your IP: ${info.remote.address}`)
})

Thanks @​rokasta12!

alwaysRedirect Option for Trailing Slash Middleware

The trailing slash middleware now supports an alwaysRedirect option. When enabled, the middleware redirects before executing handlers, which fixes the issue where trailing slash handling doesn't work with wildcard routes:

app.use(trimTrailingSlash({ alwaysRedirect: true }))

app.get('/my-path/*', async (c) => {
  return c.text('wildcard')
})

// /my-path/something/ will be redirected to /my-path/something
// before the wildcard handler is executed

Progressive Locale Code Truncation

The normalizeLanguage function in the language middleware now supports RFC 4647 Lookup-based progressive truncation. Locale codes like ja-JP will match ja when only the base language is in supportedLanguages:

app.use(
  '/*',
  languageDetector({
    supportedLanguages: ['en', 'ja'],
    fallbackLanguage: 'en',
    order: ['cookie', 'header'],
  })
)

// Accept-Language: ja-JP → matches 'ja'
// Accept-Language: ko-KR → falls back to 'en'

Thanks @​sorafujitani!

exports Field for ExecutionContext

The ExecutionContext type now includes an exports property for Cloudflare Workers. You can use module augmentation to type it with Wrangler's generated types:

import 'hono'

declare module 'hono' {
  interface ExecutionContext {
    readonly exports: Cloudflare.Exports
  }
}

Thanks @​toreis-up!

Performance Improvements

TrieRouter 1.5x ~ 2.0x Faster

The TrieRouter has been significantly optimized with reduced spread syntax usage, O(1) hasChildren checks, lazy regular expression generation, and removal of redundant processes:

Route Node.js Deno Bun
short static GET /user 1.70x 1.40x 1.34x
dynamic GET /user/lookup/username/hey 1.38x 1.69x 1.51x
wildcard GET /static/index.html 1.51x 1.72x 1.43x
all together 1.58x 1.60x 1.82x

Thanks @​EdamAme-x!

Fast Path for c.json()

c.json() now has the same fast path optimization as c.text(). When no custom status, headers, or finalized state exists, the Response is created directly without allocating a Headers object:

// This common pattern is now faster
return c.json({ message: 'Hello' })

Benchmark results:

Metric Before After Change
Reqs/sec 92,268 95,244 +3.2%
Latency 5.42ms 5.25ms -3.1%
Throughput 17.24MB/s 19.07MB/s +10.6%

Thanks @​mgcrea!

New features

  • feat(client): Add ApplyGlobalResponse type helper for RPC Client #​4556
  • feat(ssg): add redirect plugin #​4599
  • feat(client): $path #​4636
  • feat(basic-auth): add context key and callback options #​4645
  • feat(adapter): add getConnInfo for AWS Lambda, Cloudflare Pages, and Netlify #​4649
  • feat(trailing-slash): add alwaysRedirect option to support wildcard routes #​4658
  • feat(language): add progressive locale code truncation to normalizeLanguage #​4717
  • feat(types): Add exports field to ExecutionContext #​4719

Performance

  • perf(context): add fast path to c.json() matching c.text() optimization #​4707
  • perf(trie-router): improve performance (1.5x ~ 2.0x) #​4724
  • perf(context): use createResponseInstance for new Response #​4733

All changes

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.10...v4.12.0

v4.11.10

Compare Source

What's Changed

  • fix: fixed to be more properly timing safe (Merge commit from fork 91def7c)

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.9...v4.11.10

v4.11.9

Compare Source

v4.11.8

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.7...v4.11.8

v4.11.7

Compare Source

Security Release

This release includes security fixes for multiple vulnerabilities in Hono and related middleware. We recommend upgrading if you are using any of the affected components.

Components
IP Restriction Middleware

Fixed an IPv4 address validation bypass that could allow IP-based access control to be bypassed under certain configurations.

Cache Middleware

Fixed an issue where responses marked with Cache-Control: private or no-store could be cached, potentially leading to information disclosure on some runtimes.

Serve Static Middleware (Cloudflare Workers adapter)

Fixed an issue that could allow unintended access to internal asset keys when serving static files with user-controlled paths.

hono/jsx ErrorBoundary

Fixed a reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) issue in the ErrorBoundary component that could occur when untrusted strings were rendered without proper escaping.

Recommendation

Users are encouraged to upgrade to this release, especially if they:

  • Use IP Restriction Middleware
  • Use Cache Middleware on Deno, Bun, or Node.js
  • Use Serve Static Middleware with user-controlled paths on Cloudflare Workers
  • Render untrusted data inside ErrorBoundary components
Security Advisories & CVEs

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.6...v4.11.7

v4.11.6

Compare Source

What's Changed
New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.5...v4.11.6

v4.11.5

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.4...v4.11.5

v4.11.4

Compare Source

Security

Fixed a JWT algorithm confusion issue in the JWT and JWK/JWKS middleware.

Both middlewares now require an explicit algorithm configuration to prevent the verification algorithm from being influenced by untrusted JWT header values.

If you are using the JWT or JWK/JWKS middleware, please update to the latest version as soon as possible.

JWT middleware
import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwt({
    secret: 'it-is-very-secret',
    alg: 'HS256', // required
  })
)
JWK/JWKS middleware
import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwk({
    jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json',
    alg: ['RS256'], // required (asymmetric algorithms only)
  })
)

For more details, see the Security Advisory.

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.3...v4.11.4

v4.11.3

Compare Source

What's Changed

  • fix(types): fix middleware union type merging in MergeMiddlewareResponse by @​yusukebe in #​4602

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.2...v4.11.3

v4.11.2

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.1...v4.11.2

v4.11.1

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.0...v4.11.1

v4.11.0

Compare Source

Release Notes

Hono v4.11.0 is now available!

This release includes new features for the Hono client, middleware improvements, and an important type system fix.

Type System Fix for Middleware

We've fixed a bug in the type system for middleware. Previously, app did not have the correct type with pathless handlers:

const app = new Hono()
  .use(async (c, next) => {
    await next()
  })
  .get('/a', async (c, next) => {
    await next()
  })
  .get((c) => {
    return c.text('Hello')
  })

// app's type was incorrect

This has now been fixed.

Thanks @​kosei28!

Typed URL for Hono Client

You can now pass the base URL as the second type parameter to hc to get more precise URL types:

const client = hc<typeof app, 'http://localhost:8787'>(
  'http://localhost:8787/'
)

const url = client.api.posts.$url()
// url is TypedURL with precise type information
// including protocol, host, and path

This is useful when you want to use the URL as a type-safe key for libraries like SWR.

Thanks @​miyaji255!

Custom NotFoundResponse Type

You can now customize the NotFoundResponse type using module augmentation. This allows c.notFound() to return a typed response:

import { Hono, TypedResponse } from 'hono'

declare module 'hono' {
  interface NotFoundResponse
    extends Response,
      TypedResponse<{ error: string }, 404, 'json'> {}
}

const app = new Hono()
  .get('/posts/:id', async (c) => {
    const post = await getPost(c.req.param('id'))
    if (!post) {
      return c.notFound()
    }
    return c.json({ post }, 200)
  })
  .notFound((c) => c.json({ error: 'not found' }, 404))

Now the client can correctly infer the 404 response type.

Thanks @​miyaji255!

tryGetContext Helper

The new tryGetContext() helper in the Context Storage middleware returns undefined instead of throwing an error when the context is not available:

import { tryGetContext } from 'hono/context-storage'

const context = tryGetContext<Env>()
if (context) {
  // Context is available
  console.log(context.var.message)
}

Thanks @​AyushCoder9!

Custom Query Serializer

You can now customize how query parameters are serialized using the buildSearchParams option:

const client = hc<AppType>('http://localhost', {
  buildSearchParams: (query) => {
    const searchParams = new URLSearchParams()
    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(query)) {
      if (v === undefined) continue
      if (Array.isArray(v)) {
        v.forEach((item) => searchParams.append(`${k}[]`, item))
      } else {
        searchParams.set(k, v)
      }
    }
    return searchParams
  },
})

Thanks @​bolasblack!

New features

  • feat(types): make Hono client's $url return the exact URL type #​4502
  • feat(types): enhance NotFoundHandler to support custom NotFoundResponse type #​4518
  • feat(timing): add wrapTime to simplify usage #​4519
  • feat(pretty-json): support force option #​4531
  • feat(client): add buildSearchParams option to customize query serialization #​4535
  • feat(context-storage): add optional tryGetContext helper #​4539
  • feat(secure-headers): add CSP report-to and report-uri directive support #​4555
  • fix(types): replace schema-based path tracking with CurrentPath parameter #​4552

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Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.8...v4.11.0

v4.10.8

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What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.7...v4.10.8

v4.10.7

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What's Changed
New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.6...v4.10.7

v4.10.6

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Deperecated
bearer-auth options

The following options are deprecated and will be removed in a future version:

  • noAuthenticationHeaderMessage => use noAuthenticationHeader.message
  • invalidAuthenticationHeaderMessage => use invalidAuthenticationHeader.message
  • invalidTokenMessage => use invalidToken.message
What's Changed
New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.5...v4.10.6

v4.10.5

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What's Changed


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This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@renovate renovate bot added the dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file label Jan 13, 2026
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from 380fccf to 2ba9447 Compare January 19, 2026 08:58
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from 2ba9447 to f89a57f Compare January 27, 2026 23:00
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.4 [security] chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.7 [security] Jan 27, 2026
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from f89a57f to f958f22 Compare February 17, 2026 18:27
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.7 [security] chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.10 [security] Feb 20, 2026
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from f958f22 to 2a71372 Compare February 20, 2026 18:57
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from 2a71372 to 2d71f8c Compare March 4, 2026 23:04
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.10 [security] chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.4 [security] Mar 4, 2026
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