build(deps): bump actions/checkout from 1 to 4#1
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Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 1 to 4. - [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](actions/checkout@v1...v4) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: actions/checkout dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-major ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
gsnw-sebast
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Sep 20, 2024
When using `--fixed-value` with a key whose value is left empty (implied
as being "true"), 'git config' may crash when invoked like either of:
$ git config set --file=config --value=value --fixed-value \
section.key pattern
$ git config --file=config --fixed-value section.key value pattern
The original bugreport[1] bisects to 00bbdde (builtin/config:
introduce "set" subcommand, 2024-05-06), which is a red-herring, since
the original bugreport uses the new 'git config set' invocation.
The behavior likely bisects back to c90702a (config: plumb
--fixed-value into config API, 2020-11-25), which introduces the new
--fixed-value option in the first place.
Looking at the relevant frame from a failed process's coredump, the
crash appears in config.c::matches() like so:
(gdb) up
#1 0x000055b3e8b06022 in matches (key=0x55b3ea894360 "section.key", value=0x0,
store=0x7ffe99076eb0) at config.c:2884
2884 return !strcmp(store->fixed_value, value);
where we are trying to compare the `--fixed-value` argument to `value`,
which is NULL.
Avoid attempting to match `--fixed-value` for configuration keys with no
explicit value. A future patch could consider the empty value to mean
"true", "yes", "on", etc. when invoked with `--type=bool`, but let's
punt on that for now in the name of avoiding the segfault.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/CANrWfmTek1xErBLrnoyhHN+gWU+rw14y6SQ+abZyzGoaBjmiKA@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Han Jiang <jhcarl0814@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
gsnw-sebast
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Jan 11, 2025
There's a race with LSan when spawning threads and one of the threads
calls die(). We worked around one such problem with index-pack in the
previous commit, but it exists in git-grep, too. You can see it with:
make SANITIZE=leak THREAD_BARRIER_PTHREAD=YesOnLinux
cd t
./t0003-attributes.sh --stress
which fails pretty quickly with:
==git==4096424==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f906de14556 in realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98
#1 0x7f906dc9d2c1 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180
#2 0x7f906de2500d in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150
#3 0x7f906de25187 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:614
#4 0x7f906de17d18 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:53
#5 0x7f906de143a9 in ThreadStartFunc<false> ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:431
#6 0x7f906dc9bf51 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:447
#7 0x7f906dd1a677 in __clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:78
As with the previous commit, we can fix this by inserting a barrier that
makes sure all threads have finished their setup before continuing. But
there's one twist in this case: the thread which calls die() is not one
of the worker threads, but the main thread itself!
So we need the main thread to wait in the barrier, too, until all
threads have gotten to it. And thus we initialize the barrier for
num_threads+1, to account for all of the worker threads plus the main
one.
If we then test as above, t0003 should run indefinitely.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
gsnw-sebast
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Jan 11, 2025
In 1b9e9be (csum-file.c: use unsafe SHA-1 implementation when available, 2024-09-26) we have converted our `struct hashfile` to use the unsafe SHA1 backend, which results in a significant speedup. One needs to be careful with how to use that structure now though because callers need to consistently use either the safe or unsafe variants of SHA1, as otherwise one can easily trigger corruption. As it turns out, we have one inconsistent usage in our tree because we directly initialize `struct hashfile_checkpoint::ctx` with the safe variant of SHA1, but end up writing to that context with the unsafe ones. This went unnoticed so far because our CI systems do not exercise different hash functions for these two backends, and consequently safe and unsafe variants are equivalent. But when using SHA1DC as safe and OpenSSL as unsafe backend this leads to a crash an t1050: ++ git -c core.compression=0 add large1 AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==1367==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x507000000db0 sp 0x7fffffff5690 T0) ==1367==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==1367==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) #1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2 #2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2 #3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2 #4 0x555555b9905d in deflate_blob_to_pack ../bulk-checkin.c:286:4 #5 0x555555b98ae9 in index_blob_bulk_checkin ../bulk-checkin.c:362:15 #6 0x555555ddab62 in index_blob_stream ../object-file.c:2756:9 #7 0x555555dda420 in index_fd ../object-file.c:2778:9 #8 0x555555ddad76 in index_path ../object-file.c:2796:7 #9 0x555555e947f3 in add_to_index ../read-cache.c:771:7 #10 0x555555e954a4 in add_file_to_index ../read-cache.c:804:9 #11 0x5555558b5c39 in add_files ../builtin/add.c:355:7 #12 0x5555558b412e in cmd_add ../builtin/add.c:578:18 #13 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11 #14 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9 #15 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4 #16 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19 #17 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11 #18 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #19 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #20 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84) ==1367==Register values: rax = 0x0000511000001080 rbx = 0x0000000000000000 rcx = 0x000000000000000c rdx = 0x0000000000000000 rdi = 0x0000000000000000 rsi = 0x0000507000000db0 rbp = 0x0000507000000db0 rsp = 0x00007fffffff5690 r8 = 0x0000000000000000 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x0000000000000000 r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30 r12 = 0x0000000000000000 r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b38 r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r15 = 0x00005555563b9910 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex ==1367==ABORTING ./test-lib.sh: line 1023: 1367 Aborted git $config add large1 error: last command exited with $?=134 not ok 4 - add with -c core.compression=0 Fix the issue by using the unsafe variant instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
gsnw-sebast
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Jan 11, 2025
Same as with the preceding commit, git-fast-import(1) is using the safe
variant to initialize a hashfile checkpoint. This leads to a segfault
when passing the checkpoint into the hashfile subsystem because it would
use the unsafe variants instead:
++ git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==577126==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x5070000009c0 sp 0x7fffffff5b30 T0)
==577126==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==577126==Hint: address points to the zero page.
#0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4)
#1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2
#2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2
#3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2
#4 0x5555559647d1 in stream_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:1110:2
#5 0x55555596247b in parse_and_store_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:2031:3
#6 0x555555967f91 in file_change_m ../builtin/fast-import.c:2408:5
#7 0x55555595d8a2 in parse_new_commit ../builtin/fast-import.c:2768:4
#8 0x55555595bb7a in cmd_fast_import ../builtin/fast-import.c:3614:4
#9 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11
#10 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9
#11 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4
#12 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19
#13 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11
#14 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4)
#15 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4)
#16 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84)
==577126==Register values:
rax = 0x0000511000000cc0 rbx = 0x0000000000000000 rcx = 0x000000000000000c rdx = 0x0000000000000000
rdi = 0x0000000000000000 rsi = 0x00005070000009c0 rbp = 0x00005070000009c0 rsp = 0x00007fffffff5b30
r8 = 0x0000000000000000 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x0000000000000000 r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30
r12 = 0x0000000000000000 r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b60 r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r15 = 0x00005555563b9910
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex
==577126==ABORTING
./test-lib.sh: line 1039: 577126 Aborted git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1 < input
error: last command exited with $?=134
not ok 167 - R: blob bigger than threshold
The segfault is only exposed in case the unsafe and safe backends are
different from one another.
Fix the issue by initializing the context with the unsafe SHA1 variant.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
gsnw-sebast
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Jan 11, 2025
Our CI jobs sometimes see false positive leaks like this:
=================================================================
==3904583==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fa790d01986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98
#1 0x7fa790add769 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180
#2 0x7fa790d117c5 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150
#3 0x7fa790d11957 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:598
#4 0x7fa790d03fe8 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:51
#5 0x7fa790d013fd in __lsan_thread_start_func ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:440
#6 0x7fa790adc3eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444
#7 0x7fa790b5ca5b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81
This is not a leak in our code, but appears to be a race between one
thread calling exit() while another one is in LSan's stack setup code.
You can reproduce it easily by running t0003 or t5309 with --stress
(these trigger it because of the threading in git-grep and index-pack
respectively).
This may be a bug in LSan, but regardless of whether it is eventually
fixed, it is useful to work around it so that we stop seeing these false
positives.
We can recognize it by the mention of the sanitizer functions in the
DEDUP_TOKEN line. With this patch, the scripts mentioned above should
run with --stress indefinitely.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
gsnw-sebast
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Oct 18, 2025
The fill_packs_from_midx() method was refactored in fcb2205 (midx: implement support for writing incremental MIDX chains, 2024-08-06) to allow for preferred packfiles and incremental multi-pack-indexes. However, this led to some conditions that can cause improperly initialized memory in the context's list of packfiles. The conditions caring about the preferred pack name or the incremental flag are currently necessary to load a packfile. But the context is still being populated with pack_info structs based on the packfile array for the existing multi-pack-index even if prepare_midx_pack() isn't called. Add a new test that breaks under --stress when compiled with SANITIZE=address. The chosen number of 100 packfiles was selected to get the --stress output to fail about 50% of the time, while 50 packfiles could not get a failure in most --stress runs. The test case is marked as EXPENSIVE not only because of the number of packfiles it creates, but because some CI environments were reporting errors during the test that I could not reproduce, specifically around being unable to open the packfiles or their pack-indexes. When it fails under SANITIZE=address, it provides the following error: AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==3263517==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000027 ==3263517==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==3263517==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x562d5d82d1fb in close_pack_windows packfile.c:299 #1 0x562d5d82d3ab in close_pack packfile.c:354 #2 0x562d5d7bfdb4 in write_midx_internal midx-write.c:1490 #3 0x562d5d7c7aec in midx_repack midx-write.c:1795 #4 0x562d5d46fff6 in cmd_multi_pack_index builtin/multi-pack-index.c:305 ... This failure stack trace is disconnected from the real fix because the bad pointers are accessed later when closing the packfiles from the context. There are a few different aspects to this fix that are worth noting: 1. We return to the previous behavior of fill_packs_from_midx to not rely on the incremental flag or existence of a preferred pack. 2. The behavior to scan all layers of an incremental midx is kept, so this is not a full revert of the change. 3. We skip allocating more room in the pack_info array if the pack fails prepare_midx_pack(). 4. The method has always returned 0 for success and 1 for failure, but the condition checking for error added a check for a negative result for failure, so that is now updated. 5. The call to open_pack_index() is removed, but this is needed later in the case of a preferred pack. That call is moved to immediately before its result is needed (checking for the object count). Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <stolee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Bumps actions/checkout from 1 to 4.
Release notes
Sourced from actions/checkout's releases.
... (truncated)
Changelog
Sourced from actions/checkout's changelog.
... (truncated)
Commits
b4ffde6Link to release page from what's new section (#1514)8530928Correct link to GitHub Docs (#1511)7cdaf2fUpdate CODEOWNERS to Launch team (#1510)8ade135Prepare 4.1.0 release (#1496)c533a0aAdd support for partial checkout filters (#1396)72f2cecUpdate README.md for V4 (#1452)3df4ab1Release 4.0.0 (#1447)8b5e8b7Support fetching without the --progress option (#1067)97a652bUpdate default runtime to node20 (#1436)f43a0e5Release 3.6.0 (#1437)You can trigger a rebase of this PR by commenting
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