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Implement a servlet that processes HTTP requests and evaluates scripts, potentially leading to code injection vulnerabilities.
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| String script = createTaintedScript(param); | ||
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| //ruleid: tainted-code-injection-from-http-request | ||
| engine.eval(script); //Bad things can happen here. |
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Stop evaluating request headers as JavaScript
Request header BenchmarkTest00006 is decoded and directly concatenated into script, which is then passed to engine.eval(...). A client can supply arbitrary JavaScript in that header to execute on the server, enabling remote code execution on every POST/GET request. Guarding the script creation with validation or avoiding eval on user input is needed to prevent this injection path.
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| ELContext elContext = context.getELContext(); | ||
| //ruleid: tainted-code-injection-from-http-request | ||
| ValueExpression vex = expressionFactory.createValueExpression(elContext, "expression" + param, String.class); | ||
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| String result = evaluateExpression("expression" + param); |
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Avoid creating JSF expressions from untrusted headers
The same unvalidated header value is appended to an EL string and fed into ExpressionFactory.createValueExpression, with evaluateExpression executing the expression. An attacker can craft the header to run arbitrary server-side EL code whenever this servlet handles a request. Sanitize or reject user-supplied data before building EL expressions to avoid expression injection.
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| String script = createTaintedScript(param); | ||
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| //ruleid: tainted-code-injection-from-http-request | ||
| engine.eval(script); //Bad things can happen here. |
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Bug: User input directly evaluated as JavaScript code
User-controlled input from the HTTP header BenchmarkTest00006 flows through createTaintedScript() and is passed directly to engine.eval() without sanitization. This allows attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on the server by crafting malicious header values, leading to remote code execution.
Additional Locations (1)
| ExpressionFactory expressionFactory = context.getApplication().getExpressionFactory(); | ||
| ELContext elContext = context.getELContext(); | ||
| //ruleid: tainted-code-injection-from-http-request | ||
| ValueExpression vex = expressionFactory.createValueExpression(elContext, "expression" + param, String.class); |
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Bug: User input evaluated in Expression Language injection
User-controlled input from the HTTP header is concatenated into JSF Expression Language strings and passed to createValueExpression() and evaluateExpression(). An attacker can inject malicious EL expressions that get evaluated, potentially leading to remote code execution, data access, or server compromise through EL injection attacks.
Implement a servlet that processes HTTP requests and evaluates scripts, potentially leading to code injection vulnerabilities.
Note
Introduces a new servlet mapped to
/cmdi-00/BenchmarkTest00006that reads a request header, decodes it, and evaluates JavaScript and JSF EL expressions built from it.bad1with@WebServlet("/cmdi-00/BenchmarkTest00006")handlingGET/POST.BenchmarkTest00006request header.ScriptEnginetoevala script constructed from the header and a hardcoded script.ExpressionFactory/ValueExpressionto build and evaluate expressions derived from the header.createTaintedScript(String)andevaluateExpression(String).Written by Cursor Bugbot for commit f47b2ef. This will update automatically on new commits. Configure here.