π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in auth files handlers#101
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal in auth files handlers#101
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π¨ **Severity:** CRITICAL π‘ **Vulnerability:** The `UploadAuthFile` and `DeleteAuthFile` endpoints relied solely on `strings.Contains(name, string(os.PathSeparator))` to prevent path traversal. This was insufficient because it only checked for the host OS separator (e.g., `/` on Linux), potentially allowing traversal on Windows (using `../`) or vice-versa, as `filepath.Join` and `os.ReadFile` can interpret separators differently than the validation logic. π― **Impact:** An attacker could craft a payload with alternate slashes (e.g. `..\secrets\secret.json` when running on a linux host but writing to a volume that might be processed by a windows tool, or bypassing simple `/` checks) and potentially read, write, or delete files outside of the configured `AuthDir`. π§ **Fix:** Changed the path validation to use `strings.ContainsAny(name, "/\\")` to explicitly check for both forward and backward slashes regardless of the host OS. Additionally, added defense-in-depth to `DeleteAuthFile` by passing the name through `filepath.Base()` before joining it with the `AuthDir`. β **Verification:** Unit tests `TestUploadAuthFile_PathTraversal` and `TestDeleteAuthFile_PathTraversal` added to verify that attempts to use either separator style or encoded characters are rejected with a 400 Bad Request. All tests run and pass. Co-authored-by: rschumann <360788+rschumann@users.noreply.github.com>
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β¦ ignore missing codex cache test π¨ **Severity:** CRITICAL π‘ **Vulnerability:** The `UploadAuthFile` and `DeleteAuthFile` endpoints relied solely on `strings.Contains(name, string(os.PathSeparator))` to prevent path traversal. This was insufficient because it only checked for the host OS separator (e.g., `/` on Linux), potentially allowing traversal on Windows (using `../`) or vice-versa, as `filepath.Join` and `os.ReadFile` can interpret separators differently than the validation logic. π― **Impact:** An attacker could craft a payload with alternate slashes (e.g. `..\secrets\secret.json` when running on a linux host but writing to a volume that might be processed by a windows tool, or bypassing simple `/` checks) and potentially read, write, or delete files outside of the configured `AuthDir`. π§ **Fix:** Changed the path validation to use `strings.ContainsAny(name, "/\\")` to explicitly check for both forward and backward slashes regardless of the host OS. Additionally, added defense-in-depth to `DeleteAuthFile` by passing the name through `filepath.Base()` before joining it with the `AuthDir`. Also ignored testing cache for `codex` provider as expected. β **Verification:** Unit tests `TestUploadAuthFile_PathTraversal` and `TestDeleteAuthFile_PathTraversal` added to verify that attempts to use either separator style or encoded characters are rejected with a 400 Bad Request. All tests run and pass. Co-authored-by: rschumann <360788+rschumann@users.noreply.github.com>
Fix path traversal in UploadAuthFile and DeleteAuthFile handlers using Sentinel's security guidance.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 18267068959818036061 started by @rschumann