🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix arbitrary binary execution in bridge-agent#83
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix arbitrary binary execution in bridge-agent#83
Conversation
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL 💡 Vulnerability: Arbitrary Binary Execution via Path Traversal/Manipulation in bridge-agent. The bridge-agent allowed executing any binary if the user provided a full path (e.g., /tmp/exploit/gemini), bypassing the intended whitelist mechanism which only checked the filename. 🎯 Impact: An attacker with access to the bridge-agent could execute malicious binaries on the host system. 🔧 Fix: strictly enforce that the binary must be resolved via exec.LookPath (using only the filename) or found in a trusted list of common paths. Fallback to user-provided path is removed. ✅ Verification: Added cmd/bridge-agent/security_test.go which confirms that attempts to execute binaries via full path are rejected with 400 Bad Request. Co-authored-by: rschumann <360788+rschumann@users.noreply.github.com>
|
👋 Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request. When you start a review, I'll add a 👀 emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down. I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job! For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs. For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task. |
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL 💡 Vulnerability: Arbitrary Binary Execution via Path Traversal/Manipulation in bridge-agent. The bridge-agent allowed executing any binary if the user provided a full path (e.g., /tmp/exploit/gemini), bypassing the intended whitelist mechanism which only checked the filename. 🎯 Impact: An attacker with access to the bridge-agent could execute malicious binaries on the host system. 🔧 Fix: strictly enforce that the binary must be resolved via exec.LookPath (using only the filename) or found in a trusted list of common paths. Fallback to user-provided path is removed. ✅ Verification: Added cmd/bridge-agent/security_test.go which confirms that attempts to execute binaries via full path are rejected with 400 Bad Request. Also fixed linting error (SA9003) in the test. Co-authored-by: rschumann <360788+rschumann@users.noreply.github.com>
1 participant
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Arbitrary Binary Execution via Path Traversal/Manipulation in bridge-agent.
The bridge-agent allowed executing any binary if the user provided a full path (e.g., /tmp/exploit/gemini), bypassing the intended whitelist mechanism which only checked the filename.
🎯 Impact: An attacker with access to the bridge-agent could execute malicious binaries on the host system.
🔧 Fix: strictly enforce that the binary must be resolved via exec.LookPath (using only the filename) or found in a trusted list of common paths. Fallback to user-provided path is removed.
✅ Verification: Added cmd/bridge-agent/security_test.go which confirms that attempts to execute binaries via full path are rejected with 400 Bad Request.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 15368639272364646512 started by @rschumann