Add occupation field to EditUserForm and update profile template; imp… #2
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…lement EmailBackend for authentication
WalkthroughThe changes add email-based authentication via a new EmailBackend, expand user profile editing to include an occupation field, enhance the profile template with a user invitation modal and CSRF protection, and refactor the invite_user view to return HTMX-compatible responses. bzzz Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~20 minutes
Pre-merge checks and finishing touches❌ Failed checks (1 inconclusive)
✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
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Actionable comments posted: 4
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Review profile: ASSERTIVE
Plan: Pro
📒 Files selected for processing (5)
accounts_app/backends.py(1 hunks)accounts_app/forms/edit_user_form.py(1 hunks)accounts_app/templates/accounts_app/profile.html(3 hunks)accounts_app/views/invite_user.py(2 hunks)django_htmx_coding_challenge/settings.py(1 hunks)
🧰 Additional context used
🧬 Code graph analysis (2)
accounts_app/backends.py (2)
accounts_app/models/user.py (1)
User(47-63)accounts_app/views/invite_user.py (1)
get(11-14)
accounts_app/views/invite_user.py (2)
accounts_app/models/user_inivtation.py (2)
UserInvitation(15-31)send_invitation_email(25-31)accounts_app/views/profile.py (1)
get(9-10)
🪛 Ruff (0.14.6)
accounts_app/backends.py
12-12: Unused method argument: request
(ARG002)
12-12: Missing type annotation for **kwargs
(ANN003)
12-12: Unused method argument: kwargs
(ARG002)
accounts_app/forms/edit_user_form.py
9-9: Mutable class attributes should be annotated with typing.ClassVar
(RUF012)
🔇 Additional comments (2)
django_htmx_coding_challenge/settings.py (1)
116-118: All auth now routes throughEmailBackend; ensure this is intentionalDefining
AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDShere means onlyaccounts_app.backends.EmailBackendis used for both authentication and permissions. That’s fine as long asEmailBackend.authenticateis API‑compatible with Django’s expectations (e.g., handlingusernameas well as'django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend'in this list.accounts_app/views/invite_user.py (1)
19-43: Invite creation + success HTMX snippet look goodThe valid‑form path does what we’d expect: dedupe invitations for the email, create a fresh
UserInvitationtied torequest.user, send the email, and return an HTMX‑friendly success snippet that slots neatly into#invite-form-content. That behavior lines up with the modal form inprofile.html.
| class EmailBackend(ModelBackend): | ||
| """ | ||
| Custom authentication backend that authenticates users using email instead of username. | ||
| """ | ||
|
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| def authenticate(self, request, email=None, password=None, **kwargs): | ||
| if email is None or password is None: | ||
| return None | ||
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||
| try: | ||
| user = User.objects.get(email=email) | ||
| except User.DoesNotExist: | ||
| # Run the default password hasher once to reduce timing attacks | ||
| User().set_password(password) | ||
| return None | ||
|
|
||
| if user.check_password(password) and self.user_can_authenticate(user): | ||
| return user | ||
|
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||
| return None |
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find . -type f -name "*.py" | head -20Repository: e1plus/django-htmx-coding-challenge
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Fix EmailBackend.authenticate signature to work with Django's standard authentication calls
Django's built-in authentication system (admin, login views, and authenticate()) calls your backend with username=..., not email=.... Your current signature explicitly expects email, so username gets lost in **kwargs, email stays None, and authentication always fails.
Change the signature to accept username as the primary parameter and use UserModel.USERNAME_FIELD to support both standard Django calls and email-based authentication:
-from django.contrib.auth.backends import ModelBackend
-from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model
-
-User = get_user_model()
+from django.contrib.auth.backends import ModelBackend
+from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model
+
+UserModel = get_user_model()
@@
- def authenticate(self, request, email=None, password=None, **kwargs):
- if email is None or password is None:
- return None
-
- try:
- user = User.objects.get(email=email)
- except User.DoesNotExist:
- # Run the default password hasher once to reduce timing attacks
- User().set_password(password)
- return None
-
- if user.check_password(password) and self.user_can_authenticate(user):
- return user
-
- return None
+ def authenticate(self, request, username=None, password=None, **kwargs):
+ """
+ Authenticate using the configured USERNAME_FIELD (email for this project).
+ Compatible with Django's expected authenticate() signature.
+ """
+ if password is None:
+ return None
+
+ # Support both explicit `username` and keyword for USERNAME_FIELD (e.g. `email`)
+ if username is None:
+ username = kwargs.get(UserModel.USERNAME_FIELD)
+
+ if username is None:
+ return None
+
+ try:
+ user = UserModel._default_manager.get(
+ **{UserModel.USERNAME_FIELD: username}
+ )
+ except UserModel.DoesNotExist:
+ # Run the default password hasher once to reduce timing attacks
+ UserModel().set_password(password)
+ return None
+
+ if user.check_password(password) and self.user_can_authenticate(user):
+ return user
+
+ return NoneThis change allows Django's standard authentication flows (admin, built-in views) to work correctly while maintaining email-based authentication.
Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.14.6)
12-12: Unused method argument: request
(ARG002)
12-12: Missing type annotation for **kwargs
(ANN003)
12-12: Unused method argument: kwargs
(ARG002)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In accounts_app/backends.py around lines 7 to 26, the authenticate signature
currently expects email and therefore misses Django's usual username=... calls;
change the method to def authenticate(self, request, username=None,
password=None, **kwargs): then obtain the login identifier using the user
model's USERNAME_FIELD (from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model;
UserModel = get_user_model(); lookup_field = UserModel.USERNAME_FIELD) and set
lookup_value = kwargs.get('email', username) so both explicit email and standard
username calls work; perform the same lookup using
UserModel.objects.get(**{lookup_field: lookup_value}), keep the timing-attack
mitigation (call UserModel().set_password(password) on DoesNotExist), and retain
the existing password check and user_can_authenticate logic.
| class Meta: | ||
| model = User | ||
| fields = ["first_name", "last_name"] No newline at end of file | ||
| fields = ["first_name", "last_name", "occupation"] No newline at end of file |
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🧹 Nitpick | 🔵 Trivial
occupation field wiring looks correct; consider tuple for Meta.fields beep boop
Form now exposes occupation in line with accounts_app.models.User.occupation, so the profile template’s form.occupation.value will bind correctly. To satisfy Ruff’s RUF012 and avoid a mutable class attribute, you can switch the list to a tuple:
- fields = ["first_name", "last_name", "occupation"]
+ fields = ("first_name", "last_name", "occupation")🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.14.6)
9-9: Mutable class attributes should be annotated with typing.ClassVar
(RUF012)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In accounts_app/forms/edit_user_form.py around lines 7 to 9, Meta.fields is
defined as a mutable list which triggers Ruff RUF012; change the class attribute
to use an immutable tuple instead (i.e. replace the list with a tuple of the
same field names) so the Meta.fields value is not a mutable class-level object.
| hx-swap="multi:#edit_profile_form:outerHTML,#edit_profile_header:outerHTML" | ||
| hx-ext="multi" | ||
| > | ||
| {% csrf_token %} | ||
| <div class="mt-3 max-w"> |
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🧹 Nitpick | 🔵 Trivial
Profile template wiring for occupation and invite modal looks consistent beep boop
hx-swap="multi:#edit_profile_form:outerHTML,#edit_profile_header:outerHTML"+hx-ext="multi"aligns with the expected HTMX multi‑target behavior.- Adding
{% csrf_token %}inside the edit profile form is correct. - The new occupation field (
name="occupation",value="{{ form.occupation.value|default:'' }}") lines up withEditUserFormand theUser.occupationmodel field. - The Invite User button and modal structure cleanly integrate with
InviteUserView.post, targeting#invite-form-contentfor both success and error partials.
If you want to be extra strict with client‑side validation, you could mirror the model’s max_length=15 on the occupation input with a maxlength="15" attribute, but the current setup is functionally fine.
Also applies to: 49-58, 69-127
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In accounts_app/templates/accounts_app/profile.html around lines 13-17 (and also
apply to occurrences at 49-58 and 69-127), the occupation input lacks a
client-side maxlength matching the model's max_length=15; add maxlength="15" to
the occupation input element (name="occupation", value="{{
form.occupation.value|default:'' }}") so browser-side validation mirrors the
model constraint and prevents overly long input before form submit.
| # Return form with errors | ||
| error_html = '<div class="mb-4">' | ||
| error_html += '<label for="invite-email" class="block text-sm font-medium mb-2 dark:text-white">Email</label>' | ||
| error_html += '<input type="email" id="invite-email" name="email" ' | ||
| error_html += 'class="py-3 px-4 block w-full border-red-500 rounded-lg text-sm focus:border-primary focus:ring-primary" ' | ||
| error_html += f'value="{form.data.get("email", "")}" required>' | ||
| for error in form.errors.get("email", []): | ||
| error_html += f'<p class="text-red-500 text-sm mt-1">{error}</p>' | ||
| error_html += '</div>' | ||
| return HttpResponse(error_html) No newline at end of file |
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🌐 Web query:
Django form.data XSS vulnerability escaping user input
💡 Result:
Short answer
- form.data is the raw POST/GET QueryDict (unvalidated) — it may contain HTML/JS text but Django does not automatically alter those bytes. Use form.cleaned_data after form.is_valid() for validated/normalized values. [1]
- Django templates auto-escape variable output by default (so stored "<script>..." will be rendered as <script> unless you mark it safe or disable autoescape). You only get XSS if you bypass escaping (e.g. using the safe filter, mark_safe, or {% autoescape off %}). Use the escape/escapejs/json_script filters for the correct context. [2]
- mark_safe / the safe filter explicitly tell the template system "don’t escape this" — don’t use them on user input unless you’ve sanitized it. For allowing limited HTML, sanitize server-side (e.g. bleach) before marking safe. [3]
Actionable checklist
- Read user input from form.cleaned_data (not form.data) after validation. [1]
- Render user values normally in templates (default auto-escaping). If embedding into JS or JSON use escapejs or json_script. [2]
- Never apply |safe or mark_safe to user-controlled strings unless you first sanitize (bleach or equivalent). [3]
- If you must allow HTML, sanitize server-side and store or mark only the sanitized output as safe.
Sources
[1] Django Forms API — cleaned_data / forms behavior.
[2] Django template autoescape and escape/escapejs/json_script filters.
[3] Django mark_safe / safe filter and safestring utilities.
🌐 Web query:
Django utils.html.escape XSS prevention form validation
💡 Result:
Short answer
- django.utils.html.escape escapes &, <, >, " and ' for safe HTML output — use it when you must escape text in Python (it always escapes, possibly double-escaping). [1][2]
- For XSS prevention prefer escaping on output (templates auto-escape by default) rather than trying to “clean” input during form validation. Validate form semantics and types (CharField, EmailField, URLField, validators) and let templates escape user data. [3][1]
- If you need to allow a controlled subset of HTML (e.g., rich text), validate/sanitize input with a sanitizer library such as bleach rather than plain escape. Mark safe HTML only after explicit sanitization and review. Use format_html/mark_safe sparingly and never on raw user input. [4][5]
Key points and best practices
- Templates auto-escape {{ var }}; avoid disabling global/blocks of autoescape. Use escape()/conditional_escape() in Python when rendering strings yourself. [3][1]
- escape() always encodes input; conditional_escape() respects already-safe values to avoid double-escaping. [2]
- Do form validation for type/length/allowed characters and semantic checks (clean_, validators). Don’t rely on form validators to prevent XSS by escaping; escaping belongs to output. [3]
- To include user-generated HTML safely: sanitize with bleach (allowlist tags/attributes) then mark the result safe. Example flow: form -> validate -> bleach.clean(...) -> mark_safe(result) -> template. [4]
- Avoid building HTML by concatenation; use django.utils.html.format_html for safe interpolation of known-safe bits. Never pass unsanitized input to mark_safe or disable autoescaping. [5][1]
Sources
[1] Django utils.html module (escape, conditional_escape).
[2] Django source/docs for escape implementation and behaviour.
[3] Django template built-ins / template autoescape and security guidance.
[4] Bleach (HTML sanitization) recommendations and common practice for allowing HTML.
[5] Django security/XSS guidance and best-practice cheat sheets.
🌐 Web query:
Django HttpResponse HTML injection HTMX XSS risk
💡 Result:
Short answer: yes — returning raw HTML via Django HttpResponse (or marking strings safe) can create XSS when that HTML is injected into the DOM by HTMX (hx-swap/innerHTML), because you bypass Django’s template auto-escaping and HTMX will insert and execute any scripts/behavioral attributes in the fragment. Protect by escaping or sanitizing untrusted HTML, avoiding mark_safe/ SafeString, and adding CSP/other controls. [1][2][3][4]
Why (quick):
- Django templates auto-escape variables; using HttpResponse directly or mark_safe bypasses that escaping and can deliver attacker-controlled markup. [1][2]
- HTMX places returned fragments into the page (often via innerHTML). If a fragment contains <script> or attributes like hx-*/data-hx (or inline event handlers) they can run or enable further injection. HTMX docs explicitly warn to scrub third‑party HTML (and to avoid javascript: evaluated attributes). [3][4]
Practical mitigation checklist:
- Prefer render() + templates (let Django escape by default). Avoid constructing HTML strings in views. [1][2]
- Never call mark_safe / SafeString on untrusted input. [2]
- Sanitize any allowed HTML server-side with a whitelist sanitizer (e.g., bleach) — strip <script>, inline event handlers, and hx-/data-hx attributes if the content can come from users. HTMX docs recommend removing hx-/data-hx from untrusted fragments. [3][5]
- For client-side HTML you control, avoid using hx-vals/js: or other evaluated expressions that execute code with user data. [3]
- Add a CSP (Content-Security-Policy) that forbids inline scripts and restricts script sources. Note: HTMX can make CSP configuration trickier — test carefully. [1][6]
- Ensure correct content-type and CORS/origin checks so fragments can’t be fetched from attacker-controlled domains. [3][7]
- Consider DOMPurify (client-side) or server-side sanitizers for complex HTML inputs; combine sanitization + CSP for defense-in-depth. [5][6]
Key references:
- Django security / XSS guidance (auto-escape, mark_safe warnings, CSP). [1]
- Snyk / guides warning against HttpResponse/mark_safe and recommending sanitizers. [2]
- HTMX docs: escape untrusted content, avoid evaluated js: expressions, and remove hx-/data-hx in third‑party HTML. [3][4]
- Notes on CSP complexity with HTMX. [6]
If you want, I can:
- show an example Django view that safely returns an HTMX fragment, or
- produce a short sanitizer pipeline (bleach config + CSP headers) tailored to your app.
Escape user input in error_html to prevent XSS
The code injects raw form.data and error messages directly into an HTML string returned via HttpResponse. Since form.data is unvalidated user input and this HTML is inserted into the DOM by HTMX, this creates a real XSS vulnerability. A user entering " or markup in the email field will execute within the attribute context, and similar risks apply to error text.
Use django.utils.html.escape() to sanitize values before interpolation:
-from django.shortcuts import render
-from django.http import HttpResponse
+from django.shortcuts import render
+from django.http import HttpResponse
+from django.utils.html import escape
@@
- else:
- # Return form with errors
- error_html = '<div class="mb-4">'
- error_html += '<label for="invite-email" class="block text-sm font-medium mb-2 dark:text-white">Email</label>'
- error_html += '<input type="email" id="invite-email" name="email" '
- error_html += 'class="py-3 px-4 block w-full border-red-500 rounded-lg text-sm focus:border-primary focus:ring-primary" '
- error_html += f'value="{form.data.get("email", "")}" required>'
- for error in form.errors.get("email", []):
- error_html += f'<p class="text-red-500 text-sm mt-1">{error}</p>'
- error_html += '</div>'
- return HttpResponse(error_html)
+ else:
+ # Return form with errors (escaped to prevent XSS)
+ safe_email = escape(form.data.get("email", ""))
+
+ error_html = '<div class="mb-4">'
+ error_html += '<label for="invite-email" class="block text-sm font-medium mb-2 dark:text-white">Email</label>'
+ error_html += '<input type="email" id="invite-email" name="email" '
+ error_html += 'class="py-3 px-4 block w-full border-red-500 rounded-lg text-sm focus:border-primary focus:ring-primary" '
+ error_html += f'value="{safe_email}" required>'
+ for error in form.errors.get("email", []):
+ error_html += f'<p class="text-red-500 text-sm mt-1">{escape(error)}</p>'
+ error_html += '</div>'
+ return HttpResponse(error_html)Refactor to use a Django template for this form fragment to leverage automatic escaping and improve maintainability.
Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
In accounts_app/views/invite_user.py around lines 45 to 54, the view builds HTML
with unescaped form.data and error strings which allows XSS (attribute and HTML
contexts); sanitize all user-controlled values by passing them through
django.utils.html.escape() before inserting into the HTML string (escape the
email value and each error message) or, better, refactor to render a small
Django template fragment for the form fragment and return that rendered template
(Django templates auto-escape by default) so user input and errors aren’t
injected raw into the response.
1 participant
…lement EmailBackend for authentication
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