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Add occupation field to EditUserForm and update profile template; imp… #2

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27 changes: 27 additions & 0 deletions accounts_app/backends.py
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
from django.contrib.auth.backends import ModelBackend
from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model

User = get_user_model()


class EmailBackend(ModelBackend):
"""
Custom authentication backend that authenticates users using email instead of username.
"""

def authenticate(self, request, email=None, password=None, **kwargs):
if email is None or password is None:
return None

try:
user = User.objects.get(email=email)
except User.DoesNotExist:
# Run the default password hasher once to reduce timing attacks
User().set_password(password)
return None

if user.check_password(password) and self.user_can_authenticate(user):
return user

return None
Comment on lines +7 to +26
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

# Find and examine the User model definition
find . -type f -name "*.py" | head -20

Repository: e1plus/django-htmx-coding-challenge

Length of output: 214

🏁 Script executed:

# Search for User model definition and USERNAME_FIELD
rg "class User" --type py -A 5

Repository: e1plus/django-htmx-coding-challenge

Length of output: 214

🏁 Script executed:

# Check for AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS configuration
rg "AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS" --type py -B 2 -A 2

Repository: e1plus/django-htmx-coding-challenge

Length of output: 214

🏁 Script executed:

# Look for settings.py or configuration files
fd "settings" --type f

Repository: e1plus/django-htmx-coding-challenge

Length of output: 214

Fix EmailBackend.authenticate signature to work with Django's standard authentication calls

Django's built-in authentication system (admin, login views, and authenticate()) calls your backend with username=..., not email=.... Your current signature explicitly expects email, so username gets lost in **kwargs, email stays None, and authentication always fails.

Change the signature to accept username as the primary parameter and use UserModel.USERNAME_FIELD to support both standard Django calls and email-based authentication:

-from django.contrib.auth.backends import ModelBackend
-from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model
-
-User = get_user_model()
+from django.contrib.auth.backends import ModelBackend
+from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model
+
+UserModel = get_user_model()
@@
-    def authenticate(self, request, email=None, password=None, **kwargs):
-        if email is None or password is None:
-            return None
-
-        try:
-            user = User.objects.get(email=email)
-        except User.DoesNotExist:
-            # Run the default password hasher once to reduce timing attacks
-            User().set_password(password)
-            return None
-
-        if user.check_password(password) and self.user_can_authenticate(user):
-            return user
-
-        return None
+    def authenticate(self, request, username=None, password=None, **kwargs):
+        """
+        Authenticate using the configured USERNAME_FIELD (email for this project).
+        Compatible with Django's expected authenticate() signature.
+        """
+        if password is None:
+            return None
+
+        # Support both explicit `username` and keyword for USERNAME_FIELD (e.g. `email`)
+        if username is None:
+            username = kwargs.get(UserModel.USERNAME_FIELD)
+
+        if username is None:
+            return None
+
+        try:
+            user = UserModel._default_manager.get(
+                **{UserModel.USERNAME_FIELD: username}
+            )
+        except UserModel.DoesNotExist:
+            # Run the default password hasher once to reduce timing attacks
+            UserModel().set_password(password)
+            return None
+
+        if user.check_password(password) and self.user_can_authenticate(user):
+            return user
+
+        return None

This change allows Django's standard authentication flows (admin, built-in views) to work correctly while maintaining email-based authentication.

Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.

🧰 Tools
🪛 Ruff (0.14.6)

12-12: Unused method argument: request

(ARG002)

12-12: Missing type annotation for **kwargs

(ANN003)

12-12: Unused method argument: kwargs

(ARG002)

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents 
In accounts_app/backends.py around lines 7 to 26, the authenticate signature
currently expects email and therefore misses Django's usual username=... calls;
change the method to def authenticate(self, request, username=None,
password=None, **kwargs): then obtain the login identifier using the user
model's USERNAME_FIELD (from django.contrib.auth import get_user_model;
UserModel = get_user_model(); lookup_field = UserModel.USERNAME_FIELD) and set
lookup_value = kwargs.get('email', username) so both explicit email and standard
username calls work; perform the same lookup using
UserModel.objects.get(**{lookup_field: lookup_value}), keep the timing-attack
mitigation (call UserModel().set_password(password) on DoesNotExist), and retain
the existing password check and user_can_authenticate logic.


2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion accounts_app/forms/edit_user_form.py
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -6,4 +6,4 @@
class EditUserForm(forms.ModelForm):
class Meta:
model = User
fields = ["first_name", "last_name"]
fields = ["first_name", "last_name", "occupation"]
72 changes: 70 additions & 2 deletions accounts_app/templates/accounts_app/profile.html
View file
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -10,9 +10,10 @@ <h1 id="edit_profile_header" class="mt-10 text-xl">Welcome back, {{ user.full_na
id="edit_profile_form"
hx-post="{% url 'home' %}"
hx-trigger="submit"
hx-swap="multi:#edit_profile_form:outerHTML,h1:outerHTML"
hx-swap="multi:#edit_profile_form:outerHTML,#edit_profile_header:outerHTML"
hx-ext="multi"
>
{% csrf_token %}
<div class="mt-3 max-w">
Comment on lines +13 to 17
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🧹 Nitpick | 🔵 Trivial

Profile template wiring for occupation and invite modal looks consistent beep boop

  • hx-swap="multi:#edit_profile_form:outerHTML,#edit_profile_header:outerHTML" + hx-ext="multi" aligns with the expected HTMX multi‑target behavior.
  • Adding {% csrf_token %} inside the edit profile form is correct.
  • The new occupation field (name="occupation", value="{{ form.occupation.value|default:'' }}") lines up with EditUserForm and the User.occupation model field.
  • The Invite User button and modal structure cleanly integrate with InviteUserView.post, targeting #invite-form-content for both success and error partials.

If you want to be extra strict with client‑side validation, you could mirror the model’s max_length=15 on the occupation input with a maxlength="15" attribute, but the current setup is functionally fine.

Also applies to: 49-58, 69-127

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents 
In accounts_app/templates/accounts_app/profile.html around lines 13-17 (and also
apply to occurrences at 49-58 and 69-127), the occupation input lacks a
client-side maxlength matching the model's max_length=15; add maxlength="15" to
the occupation input element (name="occupation", value="{{
form.occupation.value|default:'' }}") so browser-side validation mirrors the
model constraint and prevents overly long input before form submit.

<label for="input-label" class="block text-sm font-medium mb-2 dark:text-white">Email</label>
<input
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -45,6 +46,16 @@ <h1 id="edit_profile_header" class="mt-10 text-xl">Welcome back, {{ user.full_na
required
>
</div>
<div class="mt-3 max-w">
<label for="occupation" class="block text-sm font-medium mb-2 dark:text-white">Occupation</label>
<input
type="text"
id="occupation"
name="occupation"
class="py-3 px-4 block w-full border-gray-200 rounded-lg text-sm focus:border-primary focus:ring-primary-500 disabled:opacity-50 disabled:pointer-events-none"
value="{{ form.occupation.value|default:'' }}"
>
</div>
<div class="flex justify-center">
<button
type="submit"
Expand All @@ -55,7 +66,64 @@ <h1 id="edit_profile_header" class="mt-10 text-xl">Welcome back, {{ user.full_na
</div>
</form>
</div>
<!-- Invite User Link -->
<button type="button" class="mt-6 py-2 px-4 text-gray-700 hover:text-primary" style="text-decoration: underline;" onclick="document.getElementById('invite-user-modal').classList.remove('hidden')">
Invite User
</button>
</div>
</div>

<!-- Invite User Modal -->
<div id="invite-user-modal" class="hidden fixed inset-0 z-[80] overflow-y-auto" role="dialog" aria-modal="true">
<!-- Backdrop -->
<div class="fixed inset-0" style="background-color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.5);" onclick="document.getElementById('invite-user-modal').classList.add('hidden')"></div>

<!-- Modal Content -->
<div class="fixed inset-0 flex items-center justify-center p-4">
<div class="relative bg-white rounded-xl shadow-xl w-full max-w-md">
<div class="flex justify-between items-center py-3 px-4 border-b">
<h3 class="font-bold text-gray-800">
Invite User
</h3>
<button type="button" class="size-8 inline-flex justify-center items-center rounded-full border border-transparent bg-gray-100 text-gray-800 hover:bg-gray-200" onclick="document.getElementById('invite-user-modal').classList.add('hidden')">
<span class="sr-only">Close</span>
<svg class="shrink-0 size-4" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="24" height="24" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round">
<path d="M18 6 6 18"></path>
<path d="m6 6 12 12"></path>
</svg>
</button>
</div>
<div class="p-4">
<p class="text-gray-600 mb-4">
Enter the email address of the user you would like to invite.
</p>
<form id="invite-user-form" hx-post="{% url 'invite_user' %}" hx-trigger="submit" hx-swap="innerHTML" hx-target="#invite-form-content">
{% csrf_token %}
<div id="invite-form-content">
<div class="mb-4">
<label for="invite-email" class="block text-sm font-medium mb-2 text-gray-700">Email</label>
<input
type="email"
id="invite-email"
name="email"
class="py-3 px-4 block w-full border border-gray-300 rounded-lg text-sm focus:border-primary focus:ring-primary"
placeholder="test@test.com"
required
>
</div>
</div>
<div class="flex justify-end items-center gap-x-2 pt-3 border-t">
<button type="button" class="py-2 px-4 text-sm font-medium rounded-lg border border-gray-200 bg-white text-gray-800 shadow-sm hover:bg-gray-50" onclick="document.getElementById('invite-user-modal').classList.add('hidden')">
Close
</button>
<button type="submit" class="py-2 px-4 text-sm font-medium rounded-lg border border-transparent bg-primary text-white hover:bg-primary-700">
Invite User
</button>
</div>
</form>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
</div>

{% endblock content %}
35 changes: 30 additions & 5 deletions accounts_app/views/invite_user.py
View file
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
from django.shortcuts import render
from django.http import HttpResponse
from django.views import View
from django.contrib.auth.mixins import LoginRequiredMixin

Expand All @@ -16,14 +17,38 @@ def post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
form = InviteUserForm(request.POST)

if form.is_valid():
# We could further improve this here to first check if an invitation for this email already exists and is not expired
UserInvitation.objects.filter(email=form.cleaned_data["email"]).delete()
email = form.cleaned_data["email"]

# Delete any existing invitation for this email
UserInvitation.objects.filter(email=email).delete()

invitation = UserInvitation(email=form.cleaned_data["email"], invited_by=request.user)
# Create new invitation
invitation = UserInvitation(email=email, invited_by=request.user)
invitation.save()

# Send invitation email
invitation.send_invitation_email()

return render(request, "accounts_app/profile.html", {"invite_user_form": form, "invited": True})
# Return success message for HTMX swap
return HttpResponse(
'<div class="p-4 text-center">'
'<div class="text-green-600 mb-2">'
'<svg class="w-12 h-12 mx-auto" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24">'
'<path stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" stroke-width="2" d="M5 13l4 4L19 7"></path>'
'</svg>'
'</div>'
f'<p class="text-gray-800 font-medium">Invitation sent to {email}!</p>'
'<p class="text-gray-500 text-sm mt-1">The user will receive an email with instructions to join.</p>'
'</div>'
)
else:
return render(request, "accounts_app/profile.html", {"invite_user_form": form})
# Return form with errors
error_html = '<div class="mb-4">'
error_html += '<label for="invite-email" class="block text-sm font-medium mb-2 dark:text-white">Email</label>'
error_html += '<input type="email" id="invite-email" name="email" '
error_html += 'class="py-3 px-4 block w-full border-red-500 rounded-lg text-sm focus:border-primary focus:ring-primary" '
error_html += f'value="{form.data.get("email", "")}" required>'
for error in form.errors.get("email", []):
error_html += f'<p class="text-red-500 text-sm mt-1">{error}</p>'
error_html += '</div>'
return HttpResponse(error_html)
Comment on lines +45 to +54
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⚠️ Potential issue | 🔴 Critical

🧩 Analysis chain

🏁 Script executed:

# Explore repository structure
find . -type f -name "invite_user.py" | head -20

Repository: e1plus/django-htmx-coding-challenge

Length of output: 214

🏁 Script executed:

# Check if the file exists and view the relevant section
cat -n accounts_app/views/invite_user.py 2>/dev/null | head -80

Repository: e1plus/django-htmx-coding-challenge

Length of output: 214

🏁 Script executed:

# Search for form usage and how this HTML might be rendered
rg "form\.data|form\.errors" accounts_app/views/invite_user.py -B 5 -A 5

Repository: e1plus/django-htmx-coding-challenge

Length of output: 214

🏁 Script executed:

# Check for existing security imports and mechanisms
rg "escape|mark_safe|autoescape" accounts_app/views/invite_user.py

Repository: e1plus/django-htmx-coding-challenge

Length of output: 214

🏁 Script executed:

# Look at the full file to understand request/response flow
wc -l accounts_app/views/invite_user.py

Repository: e1plus/django-htmx-coding-challenge

Length of output: 214

🌐 Web query:

Django form.data XSS vulnerability escaping user input

💡 Result:

Short answer

  • form.data is the raw POST/GET QueryDict (unvalidated) — it may contain HTML/JS text but Django does not automatically alter those bytes. Use form.cleaned_data after form.is_valid() for validated/normalized values. [1]
  • Django templates auto-escape variable output by default (so stored "<script>..." will be rendered as <script> unless you mark it safe or disable autoescape). You only get XSS if you bypass escaping (e.g. using the safe filter, mark_safe, or {% autoescape off %}). Use the escape/escapejs/json_script filters for the correct context. [2]
  • mark_safe / the safe filter explicitly tell the template system "don’t escape this" — don’t use them on user input unless you’ve sanitized it. For allowing limited HTML, sanitize server-side (e.g. bleach) before marking safe. [3]

Actionable checklist

  • Read user input from form.cleaned_data (not form.data) after validation. [1]
  • Render user values normally in templates (default auto-escaping). If embedding into JS or JSON use escapejs or json_script. [2]
  • Never apply |safe or mark_safe to user-controlled strings unless you first sanitize (bleach or equivalent). [3]
  • If you must allow HTML, sanitize server-side and store or mark only the sanitized output as safe.

Sources
[1] Django Forms API — cleaned_data / forms behavior.
[2] Django template autoescape and escape/escapejs/json_script filters.
[3] Django mark_safe / safe filter and safestring utilities.

🌐 Web query:

Django utils.html.escape XSS prevention form validation

💡 Result:

Short answer

  • django.utils.html.escape escapes &, <, >, " and ' for safe HTML output — use it when you must escape text in Python (it always escapes, possibly double-escaping). [1][2]
  • For XSS prevention prefer escaping on output (templates auto-escape by default) rather than trying to “clean” input during form validation. Validate form semantics and types (CharField, EmailField, URLField, validators) and let templates escape user data. [3][1]
  • If you need to allow a controlled subset of HTML (e.g., rich text), validate/sanitize input with a sanitizer library such as bleach rather than plain escape. Mark safe HTML only after explicit sanitization and review. Use format_html/mark_safe sparingly and never on raw user input. [4][5]

Key points and best practices

  • Templates auto-escape {{ var }}; avoid disabling global/blocks of autoescape. Use escape()/conditional_escape() in Python when rendering strings yourself. [3][1]
  • escape() always encodes input; conditional_escape() respects already-safe values to avoid double-escaping. [2]
  • Do form validation for type/length/allowed characters and semantic checks (clean_, validators). Don’t rely on form validators to prevent XSS by escaping; escaping belongs to output. [3]
  • To include user-generated HTML safely: sanitize with bleach (allowlist tags/attributes) then mark the result safe. Example flow: form -> validate -> bleach.clean(...) -> mark_safe(result) -> template. [4]
  • Avoid building HTML by concatenation; use django.utils.html.format_html for safe interpolation of known-safe bits. Never pass unsanitized input to mark_safe or disable autoescaping. [5][1]

Sources
[1] Django utils.html module (escape, conditional_escape).
[2] Django source/docs for escape implementation and behaviour.
[3] Django template built-ins / template autoescape and security guidance.
[4] Bleach (HTML sanitization) recommendations and common practice for allowing HTML.
[5] Django security/XSS guidance and best-practice cheat sheets.

🌐 Web query:

Django HttpResponse HTML injection HTMX XSS risk

💡 Result:

Short answer: yes — returning raw HTML via Django HttpResponse (or marking strings safe) can create XSS when that HTML is injected into the DOM by HTMX (hx-swap/innerHTML), because you bypass Django’s template auto-escaping and HTMX will insert and execute any scripts/behavioral attributes in the fragment. Protect by escaping or sanitizing untrusted HTML, avoiding mark_safe/ SafeString, and adding CSP/other controls. [1][2][3][4]

Why (quick):

  • Django templates auto-escape variables; using HttpResponse directly or mark_safe bypasses that escaping and can deliver attacker-controlled markup. [1][2]
  • HTMX places returned fragments into the page (often via innerHTML). If a fragment contains <script> or attributes like hx-*/data-hx (or inline event handlers) they can run or enable further injection. HTMX docs explicitly warn to scrub third‑party HTML (and to avoid javascript: evaluated attributes). [3][4]

Practical mitigation checklist:

  • Prefer render() + templates (let Django escape by default). Avoid constructing HTML strings in views. [1][2]
  • Never call mark_safe / SafeString on untrusted input. [2]
  • Sanitize any allowed HTML server-side with a whitelist sanitizer (e.g., bleach) — strip <script>, inline event handlers, and hx-/data-hx attributes if the content can come from users. HTMX docs recommend removing hx-/data-hx from untrusted fragments. [3][5]
  • For client-side HTML you control, avoid using hx-vals/js: or other evaluated expressions that execute code with user data. [3]
  • Add a CSP (Content-Security-Policy) that forbids inline scripts and restricts script sources. Note: HTMX can make CSP configuration trickier — test carefully. [1][6]
  • Ensure correct content-type and CORS/origin checks so fragments can’t be fetched from attacker-controlled domains. [3][7]
  • Consider DOMPurify (client-side) or server-side sanitizers for complex HTML inputs; combine sanitization + CSP for defense-in-depth. [5][6]

Key references:

  • Django security / XSS guidance (auto-escape, mark_safe warnings, CSP). [1]
  • Snyk / guides warning against HttpResponse/mark_safe and recommending sanitizers. [2]
  • HTMX docs: escape untrusted content, avoid evaluated js: expressions, and remove hx-/data-hx in third‑party HTML. [3][4]
  • Notes on CSP complexity with HTMX. [6]

If you want, I can:

  • show an example Django view that safely returns an HTMX fragment, or
  • produce a short sanitizer pipeline (bleach config + CSP headers) tailored to your app.

Escape user input in error_html to prevent XSS

The code injects raw form.data and error messages directly into an HTML string returned via HttpResponse. Since form.data is unvalidated user input and this HTML is inserted into the DOM by HTMX, this creates a real XSS vulnerability. A user entering " or markup in the email field will execute within the attribute context, and similar risks apply to error text.

Use django.utils.html.escape() to sanitize values before interpolation:

-from django.shortcuts import render
-from django.http import HttpResponse
+from django.shortcuts import render
+from django.http import HttpResponse
+from django.utils.html import escape
@@
-        else:
-            # Return form with errors
-            error_html = '<div class="mb-4">'
-            error_html += '<label for="invite-email" class="block text-sm font-medium mb-2 dark:text-white">Email</label>'
-            error_html += '<input type="email" id="invite-email" name="email" '
-            error_html += 'class="py-3 px-4 block w-full border-red-500 rounded-lg text-sm focus:border-primary focus:ring-primary" '
-            error_html += f'value="{form.data.get("email", "")}" required>'
-            for error in form.errors.get("email", []):
-                error_html += f'<p class="text-red-500 text-sm mt-1">{error}</p>'
-            error_html += '</div>'
-            return HttpResponse(error_html)
+        else:
+            # Return form with errors (escaped to prevent XSS)
+            safe_email = escape(form.data.get("email", ""))
+
+            error_html = '<div class="mb-4">'
+            error_html += '<label for="invite-email" class="block text-sm font-medium mb-2 dark:text-white">Email</label>'
+            error_html += '<input type="email" id="invite-email" name="email" '
+            error_html += 'class="py-3 px-4 block w-full border-red-500 rounded-lg text-sm focus:border-primary focus:ring-primary" '
+            error_html += f'value="{safe_email}" required>'
+            for error in form.errors.get("email", []):
+                error_html += f'<p class="text-red-500 text-sm mt-1">{escape(error)}</p>'
+            error_html += '</div>'
+            return HttpResponse(error_html)

Refactor to use a Django template for this form fragment to leverage automatic escaping and improve maintainability.

Committable suggestion skipped: line range outside the PR's diff.

🤖 Prompt for AI Agents 
In accounts_app/views/invite_user.py around lines 45 to 54, the view builds HTML
with unescaped form.data and error strings which allows XSS (attribute and HTML
contexts); sanitize all user-controlled values by passing them through
django.utils.html.escape() before inserting into the HTML string (escape the
email value and each error message) or, better, refactor to render a small
Django template fragment for the form fragment and return that rendered template
(Django templates auto-escape by default) so user input and errors aren’t
injected raw into the response.

4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions django_htmx_coding_challenge/settings.py
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -113,6 +113,10 @@
]
AUTH_USER_MODEL = 'accounts_app.User'

AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS = [
'accounts_app.backends.EmailBackend',
]

LOGIN_URL = '/sign-in'
LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URL = '/sign-in'

Expand Down